Canada: When to Leave

Beleaguered Alberta premier Ed Stelmach is stepping down.

It's interesting news: we've had three premiers retire or resign in the past few months. Danny Williams of Newfoundland retired with levels of support the likes of which we rarely see in Canada . The question there is how much the PC's sky-high levels of support depend on the personage of Williams himself - in other words, how much of those astronomic poll numbers are now available for the Liberals and (snort) the NDP to cherry-pick.

Gordon Campbell and Ed Stelmach wish that was their parties' main concern at the moment. You get the sense that Campbell understood that the BC Liberals were in a real free-fall, and that they had yet to bottom out. You sense that Campbell 'took one for the team', stepping down for the good of the party in order to take the blame personally for BC's current problems and let the party carry on without him. Amazingly, due also to similar stories in the NDP opposition, it may actually have worked. Time will tell, but on the day of Campbell's resignation he was looing at polls so terrible that an NDP victory at the next election seems like a done deal.

Alberta's somewhere in the middle, and this is where it intrigues so much. Its history is one of single-party dominance, where one party dominates politics for a generation and then in a single election is crushed into insignificance by another party, who holds the reins for a generation. Since 1935, these have been parties on the right: Social Credit until 1967, when they were challenged by the reemergent Progressive Conservatives, who have held the reins ever since.

By March of 2010, Stelmach's PCs were in a freefall, and the Wildrose Alliance had overtaken them in the polls. Projections based on the polls at the time showed that the WRA would have decimated the PCs, overtaking them as the party of government and as the main party of the right. And if we can understand anything from Alberta's history, that change might have been permanent.

Were Stelmach Cambell, that is the point at which he would have resigned. But he's not, and interestingly in the past 10 months or so, polls suggest the PCs have come around: surpassing the WRA or at least drawing even with them. "The inevitable" suddenly seemed a good deal less so.

I'm genuinely curious and unable to guess what this means for the 'battle for the right' in Alberta. The captain abandoning a sinking ship might be the single event that pushes Danielle Smith's Wildrose Alliance to electoral success (for thirty-some years, perhaps). Or does Stelmach see in Campbell's departure an example to imitate? Will Albertains forgive the party now that Stelmach is gone? One thing I can say for sure is that it's a huge gamble, one that I never saw coming.

Another thing I can say for sure is that while Dalton McGuinty is probably nonchalantly pretending not to care, Jean Charest is almost certainly in the curious position of wonder if there is anything - anything at all - that Québec can learn from Alberta.

Ontario and Other Kingmakers

So there's a belief that you come across every now and then that Ontario determined federal elections; that what Ontario wants, Ontario gets. Historically, this claim has most often been made in connection to so-called 'Western Alienation', the feeling that the Western provinces are left outside the halls of power. In fact, as often as not that claim is made not merely of Ontario but of Ontario and Québec in combination as 'Central Canada' or the whole of the country east of Manitoba as 'Eastern Canada'. As those geographic blocs, however, form a majority of seats in parliament, I'm not sure how meaningful it is to talk about them dominating politics. To take my point to an extreme, if someone from the North complained that 'the provinces' held too much power, they would by any definition be factually right, but it would be tough to argue it as a failing of democracy.

Breaking the country into four blocs - the West, Ontario, Québec, and the Atlantic - is practical as the four contituent parts each hold a large amount of seats (at present 92, 106, 75 and 32 respectively), and as they're each terms with historical merit ('The West' is the most nebulous term, really, consisting of four provinces each with very distinct voting trends, but when totalled, trends do emerge).

In this exercise, I've gone back to Diefenbaker's 1958 landslide, and in each case I've looked at the total number of seats per party returned in each of the four regions, and I've also considered what Parliament would look like if it were composed of the whole country minus the region in particular. In other words, a "minus-Ontario" result would be the combined seat totals for the West, for Québec and for the Atlantic (the North as well - in each case I include the North's three seats in relevant national totals, but otherwise ignore them); as if Ontario had seceded from the union prior to the election.

The point of this math is to consider scenarios where the actual government formed by the election in question (which party, and whether it was a majority or a minority) differed from the "-Ontario" result; if removing Ontario from the equation would produce a different government than actually occurred.

The overview results are interesting themselves: In 17 elections, the nation as a whole has returned 6 Liberal majorities and 4 Liberal minorities, 3 PC majorities and 2 PC minorities, and two Conservative majorities. So Liberal domination, but a relatively healthy bipartisan mix. Looking at the regions, though, shows quite a difference: the Atlantic considered alone returned 9 PC majorities, 8 of them straight, between 1958 and 1984; after that, they switched teams decisively, electing 7 liberal majorities, interrupted by their only plurality: the surprising result in 1997 when the Atlantic returned a plurality of PC MPs.

Québec looks similar. Though they went PC for Diefenbaker and Mulroney (being largely responsible for Canada's only two near-consensuses in recent history), otherwise it was Liberal pre-Mulroney (7 straight majorities, one plurality) and BQ post-Mulroney (6 straight majorities). The West, despite an amazing volatility in BC and intermittently strong NDP results in Saskatchewan and Manitoba, have been remarkably consistent in their affections. Trudeaumania took over BC in 1968 enough to return a Liberal plurality, but otherwise it's been non-stop PC majorities from 1958 to 1988, non-stop Reform/CA/Conservative majorities since.

That leaves Ontario, which perhaps is the Bellwether, based on how consistent the other three regions have been. Ontario has returned 11 Liberal majorities, 2 PC majorities, 2 PC pluralities and 1 Conservative plurality.

Overall, the West has swayed the winning party on three occasions (1962, 1979 and 2006), while Ontario has done so on three occasions (1979, 1997 and 2004), and Québec on four occasions (1963, 1965, 1972 and 1980 - remarkably a Québec-less Canada would have returned the PCs every year from 1958 to 1988 except in 1968). The Atlantic since 1958 have not once swayed an election.

Looking down the years, then:

• In 1958, Diefenbaker won a decisive majority. Each region gave a majority of seats to the PCs, so obviously each 'minus parliament' also did so. It's interesting that while the Liberals tend to be 'Canada's natural governing party', the only true landslide sea-to-sea consensuses we've seen have both been PC.
• 1962 brought a PC minority, the first of three minorities. The coasts stayed majority-PC, while Ontario returned a Liberal majority and Québec a Liberal plurality. 1962 definitely shows that the 'Central Canada' thesis has holes in it: Ontario and the Atlantic had no affect, while Québec held the PCs to a minority (a minus-Québec parliament would have returned a PC majority) and the West actually chose the PM (a minus-West parliament would have been Liberal minority).
• 1963, though, shifts the numbers just enough to prove the West's point: a Liberal minority brought about by the coasts returning majority PC MPs and the 'centre' returning Liberal majorities. But the minus-numbers tell an interesting story. Again, Ontario and the Atlantic had no effect, while the West this time kept the Liberals to a minority and Québec turned the tides, from a PC minority to a Liberal one.
• 1965 was another Liberal minority, and everything I've said for 1963 applies here too, except that a minus-Atlantic parliament would have been an even split: 116 Liberals to 116 'others'. I think technically that's a Liberal minority, but I'm not entirely sure how to classify it.

• 1968 is Trudeau's big year, and a Liberal majority. It's interesting to note, looking back, that Trudeau's party-poopers were not the West so much as the Atlantic. The West brought a threadbare Liberal minority, while the Atlantic decisively stuck with favourite son Robert Stanfield, giving his PCs 25 in 32 seats. 'Central Canada', of course, went deep red. This was a Liberal majority, and no single region could have changed it from a Liberal majority.
• Trudeau won 1972 too, but by two seats. The Atlantic kept its PC majority, the West returned to a PC majority (never again to waver), and Ontario went to a PC plurality. Thus, it seems like 1972 was Québec's year, with their decisive Liberal majority keeping Trudeau at 24 Sussex. And indeed, Ontario and the Atlantic had no effect, while the West held Trudeau to a majority, and a minus-Québec parliament would have been a PC majority.
• In 1974, Trudeau got his majority back, and the numbers are similar, just shifted in the Liberals' favour. PC majorities in the West and Atlantic, Liberal majorities in Québec and Ontario, and the notion that 'Central Canada' runs the country quite firmly established by now. This is certainly the case in 1974, with neither the West nor the Atlantic having any sway, with Ontario enough to shift it from a Liberal minority to a Liberal majority, and with Québec's vote enough to move from a PC minority to a Liberal majority.
• 1979's PC minority was interesting. This time out Ontario joined the West and the Atlantic in returning PC majorities, while Québec returned another Liberal majority. Only the Atlantic had no sway this time: were it not for the West, the PC minority would have been a Liberal majority. Were it not for Ontario, the PC minority would have been a Liberal minority. And were it not for Québec, the PC minority would have been a decisive majority. No wonder the government was doomed to failure.
• 1980 brought Trudeau decisively back, with another Liberal majority. With the West returning only two Liberals and Québec only one PC (PC majority and Liberal majority respectively), it increasingly looks like Ontario really is the kingmaker, its fickle preferences dictating results when the West and Québec are so decisive in their support for their 'home teams'. In fact, both it and the Atlantic 9for the first time) went Liberal-majority. Only Québec can lay claim to holding sway, though, as minus-parliaments for the other three regions still return Liberal majorities, while a minus-Québec again brings a PC minority.

• 1984 is our second landslide, with Mulroney's PCs gaining a majority in each region (in each province and territory, in fact) and reducing the Liberals to 40 seats. There's little to say here - electing Mulroney was a nation-wide effort, and no individual region could have stemmed that tide (or wanted to, as it transpired).
• 1988 was another PC majority, but less decisively. Ontario gave the PCs only a plurality, while the Atlantic returned a Liberal majority. With the West handing the NDP their best-ever result (while still going PC-majority, though), it seems like Mulroney had Québec to thank, proving that after years of kingmaking for the Liberals, La Belle Province could play kingmaker for the PCs too. Interesting, then, that after this election Québec will decisively turn away from affecting federal outcomes, remaining by and large on opposition benches henceforth. As it turns out, though, no single region kept Mulroney in power. A minus-Québec would have still been PC, but minority, while the other three regions had no effect.

• 1993, of course, is where everything changed. I imagine most Canadians old enough to remember could tell you that Ontario and the Atlantic sent decisive Liberal majorities, while the West sent a Reform majority and Québec a BQ majority. What all this means, though, is that ultimately not one region could be said to have turned this election, however it appears. A minus-West election and a minus-Québec election would have unsurprisingly returned Liberal majorities. So would have a minus-Atlantic parliament. A minus-Ontario parliament would have returned a minority, but the Liberals would still have won it.
• 1997 was perhaps even more interesting. The only regional overall change from 1993 was that the Atlantic went plurality-PC (thus each of the four regions preferred a different party). Like last time, neither the West nor Québec nor the Atlantic could have prevented a Liberal majority, but this time the majority was all Ontario's - two-thirds of Chrétien's MPs were from Ontario. A minus-Ontario parliament would have returned, of all things, a Reform minority. But it would have been almost completely dysfunctional, with 60 Reform MPs, 54 Liberals, 44 Bloquistes, 21 New Democrats and 19 PCs. God know what kind of bills, if any, that parliament could pass.
• 2000 was 1993 again: Liberal majorities in Ontario and the Atlantic, a barebones BQ majority in Québec, and another majority for the Party-Formerly-Known-as-Reform in the West. A Liberal majority, that without Ontario would have been a minority, but otherwise no region could have changed.
• The Liberals won in 2004 too, if a minority mandate can truly be called 'winning' and 'merely not losing'. The regions once again still look the same, though that western party is now called the Conservatives. Neither Québec nor the Atlantic could have swayed a Liberal minority, but but for the West it would have been a Liberal majority, and but for Ontario it would have been a Conservative minority. As indeed it was about to be.
• 2006 brought Harper's Conservatives a minority, elected through regional majorities: the BQ in Québec, the Liberals in Ontario and the Atlantic, and the CPC in the West. So while all four regions have returned the exact same results in each of the previous three elections, the result has shifted from Liberal majority to Liberal minority to Conservative minority. And quite clearly the West were kingmakers this time, as no other region could have prevented a Conservative minority, but a minus-West parliament would have been another Liberal minority.
• By 2008, the Conservatives had been able, with a pickaxe, to slowly pick away at Liberal support in Ontario to the point that this time out they'd tipped the balance - a CPC plurality in Ontario. The other three regions have stuck with their favourites for the sixth time in a row (excepting the Atlantic in 1997) though, suggesting again that Ontario is where elections are made and broken. In fact, though, we have Québec to thank for the current government makeup. None of the West, Ontario or the Atlantic could have changed a CPC minority, but were it not for Québec, Harper would have had his long-dreamed-of majority.

What to do with all this information? Well, what it shows me is that the West is more of a kingmaker than Westerners might think but that ultimately Québec wields the most power - especially before the birth of the BQ. It's also interesting to see just how little power the Atlantic actually have. Unsurprising, perhaps, in terms of overall numbers, but seeing how independent-minded they can be, still unexpected.

Related articles, as Zemanta would like you to know.

• ‘Cluster’ strategy puts Tories on track for majority, poll suggests (theglobeandmail.com)
• Ten years later, Trudeau divides us still (fullcomment.nationalpost.com)
• The Liberals shall rise again (fullcomment.nationalpost.com)
• Hebert: 10 years on, who will save Trudeau's legacy? (thestar.com)

New Brunswick and Disproportionality

Lately I've become interested in 'disproportionality', the extent to which a general election can produce a seat count in the House whose percentages differ from the percentages of the popular vote that produced them. If in an election, 48% of voters voted for Party A, 39% voted for Party B and 13% voted for Party C, and if that wound up with a House of Commons where 52% of the seats were filled with Party A members, 40% of the seats were Party B and the remaining 8% were party C, what would generally be considered relatively proportionate. By and large, there would be little dispute about whether the makeup of the House reflected the voting intentions of the people.

In fact, though, such proportionality is rare, particularly in Canada with its First-Past-the-Post and multiparty systems. Calls for abolition of FPTP (or 'winner-takes-all') election systems are strongest in multiparty systems; in bipartisan political systems, the effect is more minimal.

Canada is an interesting country, in that at the federal level and across each province, a number of parties vie for office. Federally, for example, we currently have five that can be called 'major'. Yet ultimately, federally and in most provinces it ultimately comes down to two parties with a realistic chance of governing and a group of others with, at best, a chance of holding sway in minority governments. The Atlantic provinces are an interesting case in point, ranging from PEI, the most truly bipartisan part of Canada, to Nova Scotia, which is perhaps the only legitimately multipartisan area of Canada at the moment. Somewhere in the middle lies New Brunswick.

For most of New Brunswick's history, it's been genuinely bipartisan: in recent years the NDP has at best been able to get one seat - the leader's - in the Legislative Assembly. Apart from that, and with one major exception (which I'll get to), the trend has been that in a provincial election the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals will combine for about 90% of the vote. In other words, the vast majority of people in New Brunswick see their elections on a strictly binary basis.

When this is the case, disproportionality changes in importance: when one party squeaks above fifty percent, disproportionality either doesn't really matter (is there a real difference between, say, 60% of the legislature or 70%?) or is of terrible importance (if the elections return a simple majority of votes for Party A but a simple majority of seats for Part B). While looking blandly bipartisan on the surface, New Brunswick actually has had quite an interesting electoral history:

• In both 1970 and 1974, the Progressive Conservatives got parliamentary majorities despite getting fewer votes than the Liberals, making fully eight years of majority government of questionable legitimacy.
• In 1987, a landslide 60.4% of the vote (compared to 28.6% for the PCs and 10.6% for the NDP) returned every single seat in the Assembly to the Liberal Party, leading to four years of unopposed government.
• The very next election in 1991 led to what appeared to be a complete restructuring of the electoral scene, as the Liberals got a second majority, but the upstart Confederation of Regions Party got eight seats, 21.2% of the vote and the status of Official Opposition, and both the PCs and the NDP has representation in a four-part parliament. Yet by the next election, the Liberals and the PCs were back to a combined vote of 82.5%.

One of the major talking points this time around was a return to multipartisanship. Theoretically, a rejuvenated NDP would become a major electoral presence, while the Green Party and the upstart People's Alliance would also be on hand to contest. At the outset of the campaign, it appeared that anything could happen. And the results? Well, that's a bit more difficult to gauge. A combined total of 16.7% of the vote for the three parties and independents looks like a victory for multipartisanship. And in fact it is - especially when the non-Liberal/PC numbers for the last election were 5.3%. Yet that 16.7% translated to no seats whatsoever - and New Brunswick is left again with a bipartisan Assembly, with only the PCs forming the government and only the Liberals in opposition.

I've become interested in the Gallagher Index, a tool to measure disproportionality. It gives a particular number, based on some fancy math resulting from the difference between percent of popular vote and percent of seats in the Legislative Assembly for each party.

I calculated it last night based on the numbers then posted on the CBC's website. It seems they have shifted a little bit, but at the moment I don't feel like recalculating the numbers. In any case:

• The PCs got 48.92% of the vote and 76.36% of the seats, a difference of 27.44 points.
• The Liberals got 34.45% of the vote and 23.64% of the seats, a difference of -10.81 points.
• The NDP got 10.29% of the vote and no seats, a difference of -10.29 points.
• The Greens got 4.54% of the vote and no seats, a difference of -4.54 points.
• The People's Alliance got 1.18% of the vote and no seats, a difference of -1.18 points.
• Independents got 0.62% of the vote and no seats, a difference of -0.62 points.

A little bit of number crunching gets, based on those mostly-accurate CBC numbers, a Gallagher Index of 22.34, which is remarkably high. Over the coming days I want to look at the Gallagher Index a bit more and compare results across provinces and across eras. At the moment, though, I'll finish up by calling attention to the fact that while the PCs did get a grossly overinflated percentage of seats, by and large it's tough to see the legitimacy being questioned: 48.92% (or 48.87% at the moment) is more than 14% above the Liberals and a hair's-breadth from being a simple majority. The lack of minor-party representation is problematic, and the Liberals' underperformance in number of seats cause for concern, but David Alward's mandate is not. He won the election, fair and square, and the parliamentary makeup shows that.